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Abstract   
 
 
Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is the best established cognitive bias in schizophrenia and is increasingly targeted in interventions 
aimed to improve positive symptoms. To address shortcomings of the standard measure to capture JTC, the beads task, we 
developed a new variant—the box task—which was subsequently validated in people with elevated psychotic-like experiences. For 
the first time, the box task was administered in a sample of individuals with manifest schizophrenia. We hypothesized that 
patients with schizophrenia would display an elevated JTC bias relative to controls. 
Method: We recruited a large sample of 101 patients with schizophrenia and matched them to an online sample recruited from 
the general population. In the box task, participants must decide which of two kinds of colored balls are presented more often. 
Participants are told that the task may end prematurely, and that task performance will be counted as an error if no decision had 
been made before that point. The primary measure was the number of draws to decision (DTD), where fewer DTD corresponds 
to greater JTC. 
Results: In contrast to expectations,  participants  with  schizophrenia  showed  significantly  higher  DTD (i.e., reduced 
JTC). Consistent with our previous findings, patients also displayed a lowered decision threshold compared to controls. 
Response confidence for the final decision was lower in patients and correlated with self-esteem and positive symptoms. 
While there was evidence that previous knowledge of the box task lowered DTD, exclusion of participants with experience on 
the box task did not substantially change results. 
Discussion: The study fits a growing body of experiments casting doubt on the generalizability of the JTC effect in schizophrenia 
across different tasks. While the study tentatively supports a liberal acceptance account of psychosis, caution is warranted and we 









1.1. Reasoning in schizophrenia 
 
Cognitive biases—for example, deviances in attributional style 
(Kinderman and Bentall, 1996; Moritz et al., 2018), overconfidence in errors 
(for overviews see Hoven et al., 2019; Moritz and Woodward, 2006a), and a 
bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) (McLean 
 
et al., 2017; Sanford et al., 2014; Woodward et al., 2008)—are implicated in the 
formation and maintenance of positive symptoms in schizophrenia. While the idea 
that reasoning/logical thinking is impaired in schizophrenia is quite old (see Jaspers, 
1913, p. 97), systematic research into processes of reasoning did not begin in 
earnest until 30 years ago. Recent meta-analyses (Dudley et al., 2016; Fine et 
al., 2007; McLean et al., 2017; Ross et al., 2015) suggest that patients with 
schizophrenia, as well as participants scoring high on measures of 
schizotypy/psychosis proneness, gather less information before making a 
judgement. This response pattern has been termed the jumping to conclusions 
(JTC) bias, which is usually defined as a decision after gathering only one or 





in the pathogenesis of delusions specifically, although its correlational 
association to JTC is at best weak (Dudley et al., 2016; Ross et al., 2015). 
 
1.2. Experimental paradigms to capture jumping to conclusions 
 
The tasks used to capture JTC are usually neutral in content and thus unlikely 
reflect a mere consequence of acute paranoia (e.g., black car in front of the house 
is taken as evidence for surveillance). Traditionally, JTC is measured by the 
beads task that requires participants to decide from which of two containers a 
sequence of beads has been drawn; typically the sequence favors one of the 
two containers (Garety et al., 1991). JTC is indicated by relatively fewer 
draws to decision (DTD). However, the original task faces several limitations. 
In particular, the task is often administered as a single trial thereby decreasing 
reliability, experience with the task likely impacts subsequent performance 
(Peters and Garety, 2006) as the outcome is often foreseeable and its parameters are 
also influenced by cognitive deficits. 
Some researchers have argued that liberal acceptance, which refers to the 
tendency to assign greater meaning to weakly supported evidence, may be the 
primary mechanism of both DTD and JTC, respectively (Moritz et al., 2016; 
Moritz and Woodward, 2004; Prike et al., 2018; Reininghaus et al., 2019). 
Under certain conditions, liberal acceptance may occur even without concurrent 
reduced DTD (Moritz et al., 2016, 2007). 
To address shortcomings of the beads task and to more accurately assess 
liberal acceptance, our group developed the box task (Andreou et al., 2015; 
Balzan et al., 2017). In the box task, participants are asked to open boxes 
containing balls of two different colors and should decide which of the two colors 
is more frequent. Subsequently, we developed a variant of the box task which 
includes a pressure condition. Here, participants are told that the task will be 
terminated prematurely and that performance will be counted as erroneous if 
they do not decide before the task is aborted. For the pressure condition, we 
found that people with elevated psychotic-like experiences were 
overconfident in their judgements, hastier, and also showed a lowered 
decision threshold (Moritz et al., 2017a). The box task has several 
advantages over the beads task. For example, the objective is more simplistic, 
making it easier to understand. Thus, it may pose less cognitive demands than 
the beads task (for the importance of working memory deficits for bead task 
performance see Freeman et al., 2014). Another possible advantage of the box task 
is that unlike the beads task many different parallel versions can be set up making it 
useful for both basic research and interventional programs which require multiple 
points of assessment. 
Recent studies have cast doubt on the notion that persons with increased 
scores on schizotypy/psychosis proneness measures are actually at higher risk 
for developing psychosis (Moritz et al., 2019a). That is, results obtained in 
people with elevated ratings on self-report measures of psychotic-like 
experiences cannot be fully extrapolated to schizophrenia and vice versa 
(David, 2010). For this reason, in this study we examined whether we could 
replicate our previously reported finding using the box task (i.e., reduced 
DTD among those scoring higher on psychosis-like experiences) in a clinical 
sample of patients with schizophrenia. The present study used the ‘pressure’ 
condition that best discriminated between groups high and low on psychosis- 
proneness, in line with studies showing that JTC is exaggerated when patients 
are put under stress (Moritz et al., 2015b). We expected that patients with 
schizophrenia would show more JTC than controls. Like the forerunner trial, the 




Patients were recruited online in the framework of a randomized 
controlled trial comparing an active intervention group (Internet-based 
cognitive behavioral therapy for psychosis; iCBTp) with a waitlist control group in 
a sample of individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (for further 
details on recruitment see Rüegg et al., 2018). 
The registration website informed potential participants about the study aims 
and provided a link to an online survey platform. 
Inclusion criteria were age of 18 or older, sufficient command of the German 
language, access to the Internet, provision of informed consent, acute and/or 
lifetime diagnosis of a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder according to DSM-5, 
simultaneous pharmacological and/or regular psychiatric or psychological care, and 
at least mild severity in one or more of the following three symptoms of the 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS): delusions (P1), hallucinations 
(P3), and suspiciousness/ persecution (P6). Criteria for exclusion were acute 
suicidality, posing an acute threat to others, a neurological disease of the central 
nervous system requiring treatment, and refusal to formulate an emergency plan. 
Following receipt of informed consent, questionnaires requesting 
sociodemographic and psychopathological data were administered online for the 
baseline assessment. If criteria for participation were met, study staff contacted 
interested persons to conduct a clinician administered telephone interview as 
second part of the baseline assessment. Interviewers conducted the Mini 
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (Lecrubier et al., 1997) 
adopted for DSM-5 criteria. For the PANSS (Kay et al., 1987), the 
interviewers rated all PANSS items except for G5 ‘mannerisms and 
posturing’, which could not be assessed via telephone. The interviewers were 
trained in extensive workshops and continuously supervised by experienced 
study staff. As a final step in the enrollment process, staff members used self-
report and interviewer data to check inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Recruitment was undertaken from December 2016 to May 2018. A total of 
7,237 persons accessed the study website, of whom 746 gave informed consent to 
participate. Eventually, 101 participants proceeded with the assessment and 
fulfilled all study criteria. 
We   registered   the   trial   (clinicaltrials.gov,   NCT02974400, 
28.11.2016) and received approval from the Ethics Committee of the Canton of 
Bern, Switzerland, (KEK 03/14) and the German Psychological Society 
(SM052015). 
Controls from the general population were recruited via WiSo-Panel. This 
German online platform provides researchers with the opportunity to conduct 
anonymous studies on large participant samples from the general population 
(Göritz, 2014). We derived data on the box task from a published study 
(Moritz et al., 2019b). From the 13,451 participants contacted by WiSo-Panel, 
1,091 started the study; 763 completers fulfilled all criteria blind to results. From 
these, 101 participants were individually matched to the patient sample based on 
parallel consideration of gender, age and years of school education (a deviation 
by one year was tolerated) but blind to results on the box task. In case of multiple 
matches, participants were picked randomly. The study has a much larger sample 
size than most previous trials examining JTC in schizophrenia. However, our 
sample still represents a convenience sample because participants were not 
primarily recruited for the purpose of investigating JTC. Sample size was 
determined by other considerations. 
 
2.1. Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
 
The PANSS is a semi-structured interview that measures 30 items capturing 
symptoms typical of schizophrenia as well as more general psychopathology 
(Kay et al., 1987). Items are scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7. The 
scale is considered the gold standard for the assessment of symptom severity in 
schizophrenia (Suzuki, 2011). The PANSS was administered in patients only. 
The interview was conducted over the telephone (see above). Interviewers had a 
bachelor's degree in psychology or higher, were extensively trained in workshops, 
and were continuously supervised by experienced study staff. To establish inter- 
rater reliability, interviewers were asked to rate an audiotaped interview after the 
workshop. The mean correlation between trainers' and individual raters' PANSS 
item scores was Mr = 0.82, CI = [0.77, 0.85] and thus adequate. For flat affect, we 
mainly rated modulation of speech and expressive aspects of the language. Other 






lack of spontaneity and flow of conversation, stereotyped thinking and poor 
rapport could well be rated via telephone. Importantly, positive rather than 
negative symptoms represented the primary syndrome of interest. 
 
2.2. Delusion and Voices Self-Assessment scale (DV-SA) 
 
We administered the German version of the DV-SA (Pinto et al., 2007), 
which assesses delusions and auditory hallucinations from the patients' 
perspective. The DV-SA demonstrates satisfactory to good internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability according to its authors. The DV-SA was administered 
in patients only. 
 
2.3. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (R-SES) 
 
The R-SES (Rosenberg, 1965) is the most widely used instrument for assessing 
self-esteem. The reliability and validity of the German version are considered good 
(von Collani and Herzberg, 2003). The R-SES was administered in patients only. 
 
2.4. Patient Health Questionnaire – Depression Module (PHQ-9) 
 
Depression severity was assessed with the PHQ-9 (Kroenke et al., 2001). 
This self-report measure captures the nine DSM-IV criteria for depression. 
Items are scored on an ordinal scale from “0” (not at all) to “3” (nearly every 
day; total score 0 to 27). Internal consistency is high (Cronbach's α = 0.86–
0.89). The PHQ-9 was administered in patients only. 
 
2.5. Box task 
 
The box task was originally developed by Andreou et al. (2015) based 
on the Information Sampling Task (IST) (Clark et al., 2006). We further revised 
the task and added probability and confidence ratings to allow assessment of the 
decision threshold and post-decisional confidence. For the present study, we used 
subtask D from the version published by Moritz et al. (2017a), which best 
discriminated individuals who scored low versus high on the Community 
Assessment of Psychic 
Experiences positive scale in terms of core data gathering parameters. After a 
short practice trial, participants were presented with a panel comprised of 12 
gray boxes (3 rows × 4 columns; see Fig. 1). Whenever participants pressed the 
“continue” button, a ball in red or green color was shown in one of the boxes. 
Unlike in the original version by Andreou et al. (2015; see also Balzan et 
al., 2017) participants could not indicate where the ball would appear. The ratio 
of the two different colors was also unknown to the participant. The participants' 
task was to decide which ball color would be more prevalent over time. After 
each step, participants were asked to endorse on a 11-point Likert scale the 
probability that one color would be displayed more often than the other (i.e., 
100% sure red (=1), 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50% (= 
6), 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100% sure green (=11); a rating of, for example, 8 
indicated that the participant thought the likelihood that green balls would be 
shown more often than red balls is 70%). 
Following each new ball, participants could either decide for color A or color 
B, or else delay their decision. If a decision was made, the participant was asked to 
provide their respective confidence rating on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
highly confident, 2 = quite confident, 3 = not very confident, 4 = 
guessed), after which the trial was terminated. Participants were informed that 
the trial would be terminated at some point before all balls were shown and 
that, in case no decision was made until this point, the trial would be counted as 
incorrect. 
The task allows computation of the mean number of DTD (i.e., mean number 
of boxes opened before making a decision for one color), the decision 
threshold (i.e., the subjective probability a participant deemed sufficient for a 
decision), the initial probability (i.e., probability rating for the first ball of each 
trial) and decision confidence as well as accuracy. In this version of the box task, 
originally termed “difficult long,” the termination of the trial came relatively 
late after the ninth ball; the ratio of the colors was almost balanced and the 




As can be seen in Table 1, the two samples were matched according to 
gender, age and years of education. Typical for online studies, there were more 










Demographic, psychopathological and box task performance of the sample frequently, means and standard devisions. 
 
Variable Schizophrenia (n = 101) Control (n = 101) Statistics 









(1) = 0.00, p N .99 
Age in years 40.04 (9.59) 40.04 (9.61) t (200) = 0.00, p N .99, d = 0.00 
Years of formal school education 11.69 (1.62) 11.71 (1.58) t (200) = 0.09, p = .93, d = 0.01 
Psychopathology and treatment related variables    
PANSS total 59.98 (14.93) – n.a. 
PHQ-9 12.26 (6.29) – n.a. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 25.82 (8.07) – n.a. 
First admission inpatient treatment in years 25.64 (7.67) – n.a. 
% maximum antipsychotic dosage 41.84 (40.36) – n.a. 
Draws to decision 5.83 (3.74) 2.90 (3.29) t (200) = 5.91. p b .001, d = 0.83 
Decision threshold in % 71.01 (16.99) 81.33 (13.76) t (157)* = 4.12, p b .001, d = 0.67 
Post-decisional confidence 2.61 (0.86) 3.64 (0.59) t (157)* = 8.58, p b .001, d = 1.40 
Initial probability in % (first box) 61.78 (16.76) 77.13 (17.40) t (200) = 6.38, p b .001, d = 0.90 
Accuracy (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct) 0.41 (0.72) 0.34 (0.89) t (200) = 0.61, p = .543, d = 0.09 
Notes. * For the decision threshold and the confidence parameters data was not available from all participants as these parameters cannot be determined if no decision is made. 
 
mildly ill according to PANSS scores (Leucht et al., 2005) and showed rather 
few psychotic symptoms accordingly but had a high length of illness and moderate 
severity of depression (PHQ-9). 
As expected, patients had a lower decision threshold, but unexpectedly 
patients showed increased DTD and lower confidence compared to controls (see 
Table 1; please note that all statistics were not corrected for multiple 
comparisons). Accuracy did not differ between groups. In a next step, we 
explored the dynamics for this inconsistent pattern of results. Table 2 shows that 
a higher decision threshold was associated with higher confidence and higher 
initial probability rating. A higher decision threshold was also associated with 
better accuracy. The more beads were drawn the lower the confidence in the 
decision and the lower the initial probability. The former result seems counter-
intuitive as more information should strengthen confidence. Yet, this finding 
might have occurred because in our set-up the chain of events 
(switching of red and green balls) ambiguates rather than disambiguates the 
solution; one may also argue that people with low initial confidence will require 
more information. 
Subsequently, a number of exploratory correlations were run between the 
box task parameters with demographic and psychopathological variables (see 
Table 3). School education, gender, antipsychotic dosage, length of illness were 
not associated with any of the parameters. 
Self-esteem (r = 0.251, p = .037) and the DV-SA delusion subscale (r = 
0.261, p = .030) were correlated with enhanced confidence. The 
conventional PANSS positive score was negatively correlated with DTD (r 
= −0.211, p = .034). Notwithstanding that patients showed increased DTD 
relative to controls, we would like to report that within the patient group unusual 
thought content (i.e., bizarre delusions) was negatively correlated with DTD (r = 
−0.203, p = .042) and (at trend level) positively with confidence (r = 0.231, p = 
.056). At a weak-to-medium effect size, draws to decision was somewhat 
increased in the group (n = 28) who had undergone metacognitive 
training (MCT, M = 6.75) compared to those with no experience in MCT 
(M = 5.47), but the difference did not achieve significance, t (99) = 1.61, p 
= .111, d = 0.35. 
JTC was counted as a decision after the first step, which was observed 




Intercorrelations of box task parameters (full sample). 
 
 Decision threshold Confidence Accuracy % first ball 
Draws to decision −0.652*** −0.519*** −0.151* −0.664*** 
Decision threshold 1 0.594*** 0.205** 0.780*** 
Confidence 0.594*** 1 −0.013 0.577*** 
Accuracy 0.205** −0.013 1 0.106 
Notes. * p b .05; ** p b .005; *** p b .001. 
40.16, p b .001. Likewise, more controls (89.1%) than patients (68.3%) 
completed the task with a decision, χ2 (1) = 13.03, p b .001. 
 
3.1. Effects of repeated administration on the box task 
 
A total of 22 non-clinical individuals had participated earlier in the study on 
the original box task (Moritz et al., 2017a). The correlation of the two DTD 
parameters (subtask D as part of the entire box task and subtask D as sole trial) 
was moderate but there was evidence for less DTD upon repetition (Mprior = 
4.91 and Mcurrent = 3.32, t (21) = 2.02, p = .056). We therefore recalculated 
the box task parameters for those participants only who had no experience with 
the box task before. All results remained essentially the same (all previously 




This study replicated previous research showing an elevated liberal 
acceptance bias in schizophrenia, but—inconsistent with most other studies—
found no evidence of an elevated JTC bias (or a reduced DTD) in this population 
relative to controls. This is consistent with a small, but growing number of studies 
showing no enhanced JTC bias in schizophrenia patients (e.g., Lincoln et al., 2010; 
Moritz et al., 2016), or even heightened conservatism (i.e., more DTD) in 
people scoring high on measures of delusional ideation (Baker et al., 2019; 
McLean et al., 2020). Unlike recent studies conducted with the beads task or its 
variants, 
the fish task (in the study by Moritz et al., 2017a, the fish task was run in parallel 
to the box task) or sheep task (Moritz et al., 2016), we were unable to find fewer 
DTD in patients in the present study. On the contrary, patients with schizophrenia 
showed relatively delayed decision-making in a newly designed task, which had 
previously yielded the expected behavioral pattern (i.e., fewer DTD, 
overconfidence, lowered decision threshold) in participants  with  elevated  
psychotic-like experiences. Yet, the previous study was conducted in a sample 
derived from the general population split according to the severity of psychosis- 
like symptoms and had been awaiting confirmation in a patient sample. In line 
with our two stage theory of delusions a lowered decision threshold was found 
in psychosis (i.e., a lower probability was deemed sufficient to decide for one of 
the colors) suggesting that patients are more liberal to consider a hypothesis/to 
make a decision. While this result was indeed expected, it should be interpreted 
cautiously in light of the uneven course of probability judgements between 
groups we will 
turn to later. 
Against the background of meta-analytic evidence and several different 
paradigms that confirmed JTC in patients, we would be jumping to conclusions  






Correlations between box task parameters with external variables (patients only). 
 
 Draws to decision Decision threshold in % Post-decisional confidence Initial probability in % Accuracy 
Age in years −0.050 −0.079 0.091 −0.008 −0.133 
Years of formal school education 0.145 −0.205 (+) −0.049 −0.112 0.142 
PANSS Sum score −0.101 0.025 0.004 0.104 0.011 
PANSS Positive −0.211* 0.064 0.133 0.063 0.091 
DV-SA delusion 0.043 0.288* 0.261* 0.048 0.149 
PHQ −0.108 0.292* −0.008 0.197* 0.131 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale −0.007 −0.056 0.251* −0.004 0.030 
First admission inpatient treatment −0.033 −0.014 0.015 0.005 −0.141 
% maximum antipsychotic dosage 0.016 0.131 0.037 −0.047 0.022 
Notes. Accuracy, 0 = incorrect, 1 = correct. 
Notes. * p b .05. 
 
schizophrenia. Yet, we may need to rethink our theoretical framework and 
investigate under which conditions the bias does and does not occur. A presumed 
advantage of the box task over other paradigms is that it collects several parameters 
beyond DTD, which may inform us about underpinnings of hasty vs. delayed 
decision-making. Looking at these parameters indeed allows some insight into the 
at first counter-intuitive results of this study. Patients displayed lower initial 
probabilities than controls; the high correlation of this parameter with DTD (see 
Table 2) renders it likely that it contributed substantially to the delayed DTD. 
Such a response pattern has been found before; in one of our studies using a 
variant of the beads task, patients showed lower initial probabilities and a lower 
decision threshold but no deviant DTD (Moritz et al., 2016). This abnormality, 
which is not found across all studies (Moritz et al., 2007), may explain similar 
or even delayed DTD. We do not think, however, that this explanation is 
sufficient to account for the entire pattern of results and recommend that 
researchers in the field should continue to seek further mediators of the 
phenomenon. We think it is 
fruitful to further explore the contribution of the following factors: 
 
1. Motivation: Poor motivation may result in premature termination of a task in 
order to save time. This mediator has been rendered unlikely in prior studies 
using graded estimates procedures (Moritz and Woodward, 2005), 
simulated decisions (Moritz et al., 2007), a gambling condition rewarding 
delayed decision-making (Lincoln et al., 2010), or the non-serial data-
gathering paradigm (van der Leer et al., 2017). Yet, we need to remember 
that initial probability, as mentioned before, also differs across studies. Thus, 
ruling out a mediator in one study does not preclude its contribution in others. In 
the current study, the controls from the general population may have been 
hastier simply because these were  “hired  for  work” (i.e., participants 
from a large participant pool who are usually paid for their services), 
compared to patients who underwent the task as part of an intervention trial 
and whose motivation was thus likely higher and more intrinsic. In line with 
this, JTC was exceptionally high in the control sample. 
2. Intelligence, task difficulty and comprehension problems: The beads 
task and possibly also its variants, like the fish and the sheep task, are posing 
high cognitive demands for some participants. A subgroup of participant 
makes illogical responses and seemingly misunderstands the task (Balzan 
et al., 2012; Klein and Pinkham, 2018; Moritz and Woodward, 2005). 
The box task was constructed to put less cognitive burden on participants. 
Yet, it needs to be tested whether it is indeed easier to grasp than the original 
bead task. Sub-task D is perhaps especially difficult as the ratio of red and green 
balls is even and one may well argue that any decision is premature (in 
contrast, in the beads task, increasing information disambiguates the task). 
The effect of subjective difficulty on task performance is hard to predict. 
Some studies point to the possibility that low intelligence and neurocognitive 
deficits foster hasty decision-making (Takeda et al., 2018; Tripoli et al., 
2019), especially in more difficult tasks (Gaweda et al., 2017), while other 
research from the field of 
memory suggests that difficult tasks may lead to more cautious responses in 
patients; the lowered confidence found here speaks for the latter (Moritz et 
al., 2015a). In this case, the high ambiguity (i.e., the sequence did not 
clearly favor one color) may have persuaded controls to decide 
prematurely. Pressure may be a double-edged sword in that it may induce 
stress in some participants which has been associated with hastier decision-
making in patients (Moritz et al., 2015b) or may trigger conservatism. 
3. Prior experience and battery: At least a subgroup of the control participants 
knew the box task, as the WiSo Panel sample had been invited before to 
participate in the beads task (Moritz et al., 2017a). We looked in how far 
this distorted results. At trend level, there was evidence that DTD was shorter 
upon repetition. Exclusion of those participants who underwent the box task 
before did not change group differences, however. Similarly, patients who 
have been treated with interventions aimed to ameliorate cognitive biases 
such as JTC and overconfidence may show normalized performance. We 
have checked for this and found some evidence (small to medium but 
nonsignificant effect size in the expected direction), which deserves to be 
investigated further. Finally, the design of the test battery may also play a 
role. Ideally, test batteries are similar across samples but this is the exception 
rather than the norm. For example, the PANSS and other schizophrenia-
relevant instruments are usually not administered in controls, which is 
also true for the present study. Time of assessment until a decision-making 
task is administered may be relevant as a short attention span may compromise 
logical thinking and influence decision-making in unpredicted ways. 
Moreover, the type of task preceding the assessment may well influence 
performance. For example, a preceding task favoring speed such as tasks 
sensitive to take the best heuristics (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996), 
may shorten decision-making while a task favoring accuracy may delay 
decision-making. In our study, the data of controls was derived from a 
study, where we tested the assumption that those high on schizotypy 
would show overconfidence, JTC as well as more subclinical positive 
symptoms under conditions that induce a dilemma (McGregor et al., 2001). This 
hypothesis was not verified, that is, participants exposed to the dilemma 
showed similar results as those on the control condition. However, it cannot 
be excluded that both the experimental and the control condition speeded 
performance. Speaking for this argument, the rate of JTC (decision after one 
box opened) was exceptionally high in controls. 
4. The role of psychopathology: For exploratory purposes, we looked at 
correlates of box task performance. While none of these would have 
withstood a Bonferroni correction, some interesting results emerged that 
should be followed up. In line with the literature, there was a small 
association between positive symptoms and fewer DTD. More 
interestingly, psychopathology and self-esteem were correlated with 
confidence. Both aspects may be very central to our understanding of 
psychosis but have not been linked much before. Conviction, an extreme form 
of confidence, is a core criterion of delusions (Jaspers, 1913) while self-esteem 




(Freeman et al., 1998) but volatile and associated with the delusional content 
(Sundag et al., 2015). So far, the evidence that low self-esteem is a risk factor 
for psychosis is not fully conclusive, perhaps owing to methodological problems 
(Moritz et al., 2017c). Yet, there are some suggestions that fluctuations in self-
esteem may be involved in the formation of paranoia (Udachina et al., 2014) 
and it has been recommended that confidence should be considered in this 
context (Thewissen et al., 2008). Such a study will likely refute any simple trait-
like differences of patients and controls in terms confidence level but perhaps 
highlight contextual variables that may exaggerate confidence and 
subsequently paranoia. Such sparks may  already  be  sufficient  to  trigger  
psychological  processes (e.g., confirmation bias) that can foster the onset of 
delusional ideas. The study faces several limitations. In addition to the issues 
already discussed, it is worth noting that the schizophrenia sample displayed 
few core symptoms. Further, we only administered a single trial of the box task, 
which had best discriminated individuals high and low on psychotic-like 
experiences in our forerunner study. This unexpected result was not replicated 
which could mean different things apart from the confirmation of the null 
hypothesis. For example, it could be that excessive JTC in patients needs time to 
evolve (the present study administered subtask D only, while it was preceded by 
other subtasks in the forerunner study). One may argue, however, that repeated 
presentation of the beads task, the conventional task to capture JTC, rather 
washes out group differences (Rausch et al., 2014). We have no explanation as 
to why this could be the case but it deserves to be tested. Otherwise, a single 
trial is clearly unreliable and we should have administered other JTC 
paradigms concurrently, for example, the “Judge Advisor System” (Scheunemann et 
al., 2020) or the “What is this?” task (Serrano-Guerrero et al., 2020). 
Unfortunately, different tests show inconsistent external validity; for example, 
variants of the beads task are modestly correlated with the box task (Moritz et al., 
2017a) and there was no relationship with a subjective (self-report) measure of 
JTC (Peters et al., 2014). Finally, our design was unbalanced, in the sense that the 
assessment battery was not identical in the two participant groups. For example, the 
self-esteem scale was used in patients only. 
To conclude, the study found evidence for a lowered decision threshold but not 
less JTC in participants with psychosis. This challenges the ubiquity of the JTC 
in psychosis. Researchers may explore why some successors of the beads task 
have found JTC in patients (Moritz et al., 2006; Moritz and Woodward, 2006b; 
Serrano-Guerrero et al., 2020;  Speechley et al., 2010; Veckenstedt et al., 
2011; Ziegler et al., 2008) while others have not. 
We encourage researchers to further examine possible mediators but also 
moderators that may explain the waxing and waning nature of JTC in psychosis. 
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